Blog post
Blue valuing green? Public engagement with climate change on the centre-right
This guest blog is by Valerie Mocker, who recently completed her postgraduate degree in Environmental Policy at Oxford University. Here, she describes findings from her dissertation research. They suggest that framing climate change as an ‘economic’ challenge may not be the best way to engage conservative audiences, leading people to externalise responsibility of climate change and express higher degrees of fatalism about the issue.
The question of how to more effectively communicate with members of the public who hold centre-right political views is becoming increasingly important. Numerous studies show that in the UK – as elsewhere in the Anglo-Saxon world – sceptical voices and beliefs about climate change are concentrated among Conservative voters (Whitmarsh, 2011), the conservative media (Painter, 2011) and think-tanks on the political right (e.g., the Global Warming Policy Foundation). For scientists, policy makers and the wide range of actors who speak to right-leaning audiences about climate change, the question of how to communicate more effectively is a critical one.
In new research that I conducted as part of a post-graduate degree in Environmental Policy at Oxford University, I asked whether different ways of framing messages about climate change in order to appeal to different types of values would produce different responses from Conservative voters.
It is widely assumed that reaching right-wing audiences on environmental issues means spelling out the economic advantages of low-carbon industry, or the value of renewable energy technologies for the economy. However, my findings showed that in several important ways, using an explicitly ‘economic’ framing for climate change messages is likely to be counter-productive, even for Conservative voters.
Conservative values for sustainability
The link between different values and pro-environmental attitudes and behaviour has been widely discussed. According to Schwartz’s (1992) widely-used model, values can be broadly separated into extrinsic and intrinsic types. Extrinsic values include economic success and anthropocentrism (valuing the environment for its services to humans). On the other hand, intrinsic values include altruism, benevolence (enhancing welfare of people outside ones immediate group which can include future generations) and biocentrism (granting nature intrinsic value).
Intrinsic values have been shown to positively correlate with pro-environmental attitudes and behaviours in a wide range of studies, whereas extrinsic values seem to be unhelpful in provoking such attitudes and behaviours. As a result, there have been calls for climate change communication to be framed around intrinsic, rather than extrinsic values (e.g., Crompton, 2010). In addition, there are different types of intrinsic and extrinsic values that are relevant for those of different political persuasions. For those on the centre-right, intrinsic values are likely to include an emphasis on intergenerational duty, and the idea that people are responsible for their local communities (both forms of the value type ‘benevolence’ – Shrubsole, 2011). Cultural conservatism, to preserve the nation’s heritage – such as the British countryside– is a form of biocentrism and thereby another intrinsic value.
However, the way that climate change is talked about in UK policy documents is overwhelmingly extrinsic in its focus. My research found that climate change is typically framed around economic burdens and benefits. Low carbon transport policies are an excellent example of that. With its title “Creating (economic) Growth, Cutting Carbon”, the 2011 White Paper on Local Sustainable Transport is a case in point as it utilises a heavily economic framing.
Framing transport policy to reach Conservative audiences
My experiment tested two opposing ways of framing sustainable transport policies with Conservative voters. Both frames were designed to appeal to the values typically held by those on the centre-right, but one focused on extrinsic, the other on intrinsic values. Participants saw one of two video speeches on low-carbon transport (which you can view here and here).
Both speeches were identical in the way they introduced UK transport problems and the need for the electrification and increased use of public transport, as well as cycling and walking. Whereas the “extrinsic” video framed these issues around economic and nationalistic concerns, the “intrinsic” video discussed dangers and benefits for the health of communities, intergenerational duties and the intrinsic value of the environment. Among others, two very interesting results emerged from this study.
Firstly, people who were exposed to economic arguments showed a much stronger externalisation of responsibility to the government, who they considered responsible for achieving a sustainable transport system. In addition, this group also showed higher levels of fatalism which significantly impeded people’s perception of their own ability and responsibility to make a positive difference to transport and climate change. Both externalisation of responsibility to the “Other” and a sense of fatalism have been shown to be serious barriers to personal engagement with climate change issues (Lorenzoni et.al. 2011). In contrast, the intrinsic video seemed to provoke a feeling of empowerment that then translated into motivation to act.
Secondly, the intrinsic frame resonated particularly well with women, whereas no gender difference appeared in the group that saw the extrinsic video. Indeed, previous research already established that women tend to show greater concern for environmental issues. However, this study implies that such tendencies can be further amplified when emphasising community health and intergenerational responsibilities.
In short, extrinsic and intrinsic frames differed most significantly in their ability to raise a sense of personal responsibility to make policy goals happen. However, it is the economic frame that is widely employed in current policy communication – which I found caused stronger externalisation of responsibility and feelings of fatalism. This is a significant problem as behaviour change, which is heavily dependent on a sense of empowerment and personal responsibility, will be crucial for achieving significant carbon reductions (Banister 2010).
The implications for climate change communication
First of all, policy makers should explore intrinsic framings, especially when they want citizens to take on responsibility for change. When talking to Conservatives specifically, the values employed should embrace intrinsic shades of Conservatism, such as an emphasis on community well-being, intergenerational duty and representation of the environment not as a service provider but as (for example) something that deserves to be protected.
Secondly, policy makers could broaden their support network by strategically targeting particularly receptive groups. Women, and organisations such as The Conservative Women’s organisation, would be a good starting point when employing intrinsic frames.
However, reframing is not enough. Firstly, whereas my experiment showed that the intrinsic frame was more successful in provoking feelings of personal responsibility and empowerment, such pronounced differences did not appear for other measures, such as an increased issue recognition or changes in scepticism. Secondly, despite successful communication, various subsequent barriers often prevent behaviour change, among them infrastructural constraints and habit.
Interestingly, a qualitative part of my study showed that uncertainties about electric cars were the most common criticism of the speeches. Respondents argued that electric cars only made sense if those were part of a wider policy set including clean energy production. Additionally, participants were uncertain about the meaning of “sustainability” and the mechanisms of achieving it. In other words, despite the importance of exploring different framings, the substance of the message still matters – and there is no substitute for a coherent policy proposal that shows clearly how governments and citizens can work together to achieve meaningful action on climate change.
References
Anon, 2011. Creating Growth, Cutting Carbon. Making Sustainable Local Transport Happen, London.
Banister, David, 2010. Cities, urban form and sprawl: A european perspective. In ECMT Road Table Report 137. p. 112.
Crompton, T., 2010. Common Cause: The Case for Working with Cultural Values. London
Painter, J., 2011. Poles Apart. The International Reporting of Climate Scepticism, Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism
Schwartz, S.H., 1992. Universals in the content and structure of values: Theory and empirical tests in 20 countries. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. New York: Academic Press, pp. 1–65.
Shrubsole, Guy, 2011. The environment and conservative values. In Boyle, D. Different Politics, Same Planet. Values for sustainable development beyond left and right. London
Whitmarsh, L, 2011. Scepticism and uncertainties about climate change: dimensions, determinants and change over time. Environment & Planning A, 43(2), 258–261
Above: “.…sceptical voices and beliefs about climate change are concentrated among Conservative voters (Whitmarsh, 2011), the conservative media (Painter, 2011) and think-tanks on the political right (e.g., the Global Warming Policy Foundation).”
The GWPF is a cross-party organisation. Someone completing a postgrad degree in environmental policy, and aiming to produce research that identifies the best ways to ‘engage’ individuals committed to particular political ideas ought to be able to tell the difference.
This blog post, and the research it seems to summarise, takes an extraordinary patronising and instrumental view of perspectives on the economic right in particular and in the public in general.
The way to ‘engage’ with people who have different perspectives is to answer their arguments, not to develop strategies that circumvent or obfuscate political debate.
Rather than identifying the barrier to ‘climate change communication’, this research merely reproduces the problem: the intransigence of environmentalism. The field of ‘climate change research’ conceives of ‘engagement’ not as dialogue, but as carefully directed argument. To anyone else but those already committed to such a project as ‘climate change communication’, such arguments appear mealy mouthed, and hence only serve to alienate the ‘climate change communicator’.
Yet more climate policy advice from someone without a technical bone in their body:-
“..part of my study showed that uncertainties about electric cars were the most common criticism of the speeches. Respondents argued that electric cars only made sense if those were part of a wider policy set including clean energy production.”
No — uncertainties about electric cars stem from the knowledge, by anybody with a science GCSE who can read a road test review, that a situation is likely to arise where they will be left sitting by the roadside wondering what do do with their publicly subsidised, £25,000 immobile ornament.
It’s going to take at least another decade for the energy density of practical batteries or fuel cells to catch up with the average car owner’s useage pattern.
I don’t expect they cover that in anthropology classes though.
Ben — what GWPF says it is and what it actually is are two quite different things, I find. It is Lawson’s ideology that drives it, and so describing it as of the political right is not misleading, even if technically speaking their membership (when do we ever hear anything from them?) is cross-party.
Adam — ‘what GWPF says it is and what it actually is are two quite different things, I find. It is Lawson’s ideology that drives it, and so describing it as of the political right is not misleading, even if technically speaking their membership (when do we ever hear anything from them?) is cross-party.’
Well the fact is it *is* cross party, and I haven’t seen any meaningful attempt on your behalf to explain how the putative ‘ideology’ behind the GWPF is expressed in its criticism of policy. Your work on the subject that I have seen presupposes that *an* ‘ideology’ is coincident with something approximate to ‘climate scepticism’, but as I have pointed out to you, this is inadequate.
First, you do not do either the driving ‘ideology’ or the seemingly consequent scepticism the honour of taking these arguments at face value, and seem instead preoccupied with intrigue and innuendo. Second, the political concepts used in this field of research are inconsistent, nebulous, and lack academic rigour. Third, and most fatally, this research and this field consistently fails to identify itself and its own ideological and political ‘motivation’ — a point which has been rehearsed many times on twitter, and which needs no more repetition here.
Suffice it to say that what is presented as academic research in ‘climate change communication’ is identical in style and substance to environmental activist organisations’ strategy documents. No coincidence, I argue. And the only reason it qualifies as ‘academic’ is, it seems clear to me, its utility as ‘policy-relevant research’. What is a surprise to me that researchers should be so oblivious to the context of their own research. In other fields of social study, such problems were detected many decades ago, if not more.
An interesting study, but rather peripheral if the aim is to reduce CO2 emissions rather than to engage people. By far the most sensible way to reduce emissions is to put a price on them, preferably via a carbon tax. Then people don’t need to be engaged, they just need to do what they normally do, purchase the best value goods and services they can find, which will be likely to be low-carbon ones.
@cwhope
It is worth reading Roger Scruton’s book, Green Philosophy, which says a lot of sensible and thoughtful things about how right wing people can think of environmental issues.
Proper Conservatives believe in conserving — and so see it as a personal responsibility to tread lightly on the planet. They are in contrast to libertarians who seem usually to use that term as a cover for unconstrained selfishness and slobbishness.
Perhaps Chris misses the point of ‘climate change communication’. The problem in a (nominative) democracy is that, even where there is a party-political consensus, it’s often not a consensus that includes the public. ‘Climate change communication’ is about circumventing the problems of such a democratic deficit that would be created by or preclude explicit interventions such as regressive taxation and ‘behavioural change’.
Chris knows this, of course — he’s a climate change policy researcher — but is not troubled by the realities of post-democratic politics.
adam (November 23, 2012 at 11:28 am)
“…what GWPF says it is and what it actually is are two quite different things, I find. It is Lawson’s ideology that drives it..”
Barry Woods frequently makes the point that “what talkingclimate (COIN, etc.) says it is and what it actually is are two quite different things.” He finds that “it is Corner’s ideology that drives it..”
I frequently try to counter this view, pointing out that we should take people’s views at face value, and not enquire too deeply into their political or other ideological motivations, unless there is evidence of intellectual dishonesty.
Valerie Mocker and Adam Corner presumably wouldn’t agree.
This is all quite entertaining. Ben is right. To put it more bluntly, when will the left-wing activists playing at being serious academics realise that the problem is not with the manner of communication but with the content of what they are saying? The idea that simply by reframing the message, people will conform to your preachy propaganda is quite comical and very naive. And the irony of claiming that the GWPF is motivated by Lawson’s right-wing views shows an amazing lack of self-awareness.
Commenters who dismiss this study seem to miss the point that the study has demonstrated how two kinds of messages are received by centre-right people. You can huff and puff all you like about what YOU think will convince people, but this study has some actual evidence of what DOES convince centre-right people.
As for the GWPF — they make blanket statements on their “Who we are” page that the “science of global warming is an … issue is not yet settled” and they “regard observational evidence and understanding the present as more important and more reliable than computer modelling or predicting the distant future.”
That makes them hobbled, blinkered and biased.
Their goal is to stop government policies that migitate dangerous climate change because they say these policies are too expensive.
Their hand on heart claims to NOT be on the political right are nonsense. These are the goals of most right wing think tanks that lobby against policies to mitigate dangerous climate change. Indeed, I’m struggling to think of any left-leaning think tanks that focus on disrupting policies to address climate change. Anyone know any?
They might have members from a range of political parties, but if you walk like a duck and quack like a duck, you can call yourself a swan or a giraffe, but it ain’t so.
Ben — instead of pretending GWPF is something it’s not, you should be proud of their right-wing duckiness!
Helen — ‘These are the goals of most right wing think tanks that lobby against policies to mitigate dangerous climate change. Indeed, I’m struggling to think of any left-leaning think tanks that focus on disrupting policies to address climate change. Anyone know any?’
There are two problems for Helen here. The first is that her logic is circular: the GWPF are sceptical of climate change, only right-wing think-tanks are sceptical of climate change, therefore the GWPF is a right-wing think-tank. If a left-wing think-tank were to be sceptical of climate change, it would undoubtedly be seen as a right wing think tank.
The second problem is one of category error. There is nothing ‘left’ or ‘right’ about the issue of climate change, and thinkers from the economic right, advocating the abolition of public property, were amongst the first to embrace modern environmentalism — through the institutions of private property, rather than through supranational organisations. So if there are right vs. left dimensions to the discussion, it might be better to see assent or dissent to the *political* consensus as an expression of preference for/against the institutional apparatus that is putatively intended to solve the problem of climate change.
This opens up a third problem. Conventional climate wisdom has it that ‘global problems need global solutions’. Yet the reverse is equally true: global solutions need global problems. A desire for the ‘solution’ may be prior to the problem, confounding any clear view of the left/right dimension. And indeed it is, if we take the view that the left has absorbed environmentalism — of the kind which prefers ‘global solutions’ — more comprehensively than the right. It is no coincidence that the character of both the radical and mainstream ‘left’ has changed while it has attempted to define itself through the emphasis on environmental sustainability: it has lost its historic connection with its constituency and its philosophical tradition. It follows that where political movements have exhausted their capacity to mobilise popular support from below, they seek it from above. As Peter Mandelson put it: this is a post-democratic era. Political crises, involving problems of definition and democratic legitimacy exist prior to the climate change issue, further besetting any possibility of understanding its treatment by any nominative ‘left’ or ‘right’ think tanks or perspectives. ‘Left’ and ‘right’ stand for far less than they did in the past.
And this raises a fourth problem. There are very good reasons why a right perspective might now take issue with environmentalism. In the past, however, it would have been the left which would have challenged the view of human society being closely dependent on natural processes as is now emphasised by the political consensus, and was emphasised by the right.
The fact that ‘left’ think tanks don’t seem to be as critical of environmentalism is owed mostly to the fact of their failure to sustain a ‘left’ perspective at all. At best, ‘left’ stands today for a somewhat diluted form of social democracy, with only a self-serving and instrumental understanding of ‘social’, and barely disguised contempt for ‘democracy’. Certainly, the ideas of autonomy and agency have disappeared from the left’s language, giving its arguments an increasingly authoritarian flavour.
The categories that Helen wants to use to understand the climate debate, per Mocker’s study are far more fluid than either of them will admit. The research is defunct because it fails to achieve an understanding of the arguments in currency. Instead, ‘right’ becomes a mere noun, divorced from its history or meaning, and means something only to others involved in ‘climate change communication’. The word ‘bogeyman’ would make just as much sense.
It seems to me that a lot of this research happens because advocates for climate action don’t listen. When people don’t respond the way they expect, they make up some explanation based on their preconceptions. When that explanation is proved wrong, they make up another explanation. And so on. They seem unable to simply ask why people disagree, or to accept it as a possibility if told.
The interaction of ideology and beliefs about science is more subtle. I don’t pretend to entirely understand it myself. But a big part of it is that people tend to weight the reliability of evidence depending on whether it matches what they already know. If it aligns with their politics, they’ll set a much lower threshold; accepting arguments from authority, vague plausibility arguments, anecdotes, and stereotypes. If it conflicts with their politics, they’ll examine the evidence minutely, check data, test consistency, and demand much higher quality and set a higher bar for the standard of evidence required to accept it.
Climate sceptics are sceptical because of the science. They’re sceptical because they’ve dug into the evidence and found it wanting. They care enough to say so, and to argue endlessly about it, because of the politics. It’s likely that they only dug into it in such depth because of their strong feelings about the proposals for ‘solutions’, driven by politics. But having been motivated to develop an evidential basis for their scepticism, they will not be moved from it now by ‘framing’ and appealing to their values. They can only be moved by better evidence.
The influence of ideology applies to both sides, and it is a persistent failing of believers in climate action to continually seize on research and analysis that shows ideological effects and selectively apply them only to the other side. It never seems to occur to them that it must apply to themselves too, and therefore their own beliefs could be equally ideologically inspired. That it could be their own evaluation of evidence that was being weighted to discount uncomfortable news as unreliable. It’s peculiarly paradoxical.
From a scientific point of view, it would be just as valid to research how left-wing values could be used to frame a message encouraging climate scepticism, and to test which approaches gave the biggest impact. If you’re only interested in understanding how humans form and update beliefs, in the pure communications science, it’s surely an interesting question and a wide-open field at the moment. But I suspect the suggestion will be shocking to researchers, and unlikely to get funding, because of course it would fly in the face of their own subconscious political intentions. Academic science is in the service of politics — and is now unwilling to look at itself in the mirror.