Blog post

Cultural cognition and climate change

Mar 7, 2012 by | 1 Comment

This week we have a guest blog by Professor Dan Kahan of Yale University (and vis­iting Professor at Harvard University). Dan is a key member of the ‘cul­tural cog­ni­tion’ research group, and one of the leading experts on the social and psy­cho­lo­gical pro­cesses that shape public atti­tudes about major soci­etal issues like cli­mate change. Here Dan explains what the cul­tural cog­ni­tion research pro­gramme is, what it has to do with cli­mate change, and why he thinks that the standard way of under­standing scep­ti­cism about cli­mate change is misguided.

I’m going to resist the academic’s instinct to start with a long, abstract dis­cus­sion of what cul­tural cog­ni­tion is and the theory behind it. Instead, I’m going to launch straight into a prac­tical argu­ment based on this line of research. My hope is that the argu­ment will give you a glimpse of the essentials—and an appetite for delving further.

The argu­ment has to do with the con­tri­bu­tion that mis­in­form­a­tion makes to the dis­pute over cli­mate change. I want to sug­gest that the normal account of this is wrong.

The normal account envi­sions, in effect, that the dis­pute is fueled by an external force—economic interest groups, say—inundating a cred­u­lous public with inac­curate claims about risk.

I would turn this account more or less on its head: the cli­mate change dis­pute, I want to argue, is fueled by a motiv­ated public whose (uncon­scious) desire to form cer­tain per­cep­tions of risk makes it pos­sible (and prof­it­able) to mis­in­form them.

As evid­ence, con­sider an exper­i­ment that my col­leagues at the Cultural Cognition Project and I did.
In it, we asked the par­ti­cipants (a rep­res­ent­ative sample of 1500 U.S. adults) to examine the cre­den­tials of three sci­ent­ists and tell us whether they were “know­ledge­able and cred­ible experts” about one or another risk—including cli­mate change, dis­posal of nuc­lear wastes, and laws allowing cit­izens to carry con­cealed weapons in public. Each of the sci­ent­ists (they were fic­tional; we told sub­jects that after the study) had a Ph.D. in a seem­ingly rel­evant field, was on the fac­ulty of an elite uni­ver­sity, and was iden­ti­fied as a member of the National Academy of Sciences.

Whether study sub­jects deemed the fea­tured sci­ent­ists to be “experts,” it turned out, was strongly pre­dicted by two things: the pos­i­tion we attrib­uted to the sci­ent­ists (in short book excerpts); and the cul­tural group mem­ber­ship of the sub­ject making the determination.

Where the fea­tured sci­entist was depicted as taking what we called the “high risk” pos­i­tion on cli­mate change (it’s hap­pening, is caused by humans, will have bad con­sequences, etc.) he was readily cred­ited as an “expert” by sub­jects with egal­it­arian and com­munit­arian cul­tural values, a group that gen­er­ally sees envir­on­mental risks as high, but not by sub­jects with hier­arch­ical and indi­vidu­al­istic values, a group that gen­er­ally sees envir­on­mental risks as low. However, the pos­i­tions of these groups shifted—hierarchical indi­vidu­al­ists more readily saw the same sci­entist as an “expert,” while egal­it­arian comuni­atarians did not—when he was depicted as taking a “low risk” pos­i­tion (cli­mate change is uncer­tain, models are unre­li­able, more research necessary).

The same thing, moreover, happened with respect to the sci­ent­ists who had written books about nuc­lear power and about gun con­trol: sub­jects were much more likely to deem the sci­entist an “expert” when he advanced the risk pos­i­tion that pre­dom­in­ated in the sub­jects’ respective cul­tural groups than when he took the con­trary position.

This result reflects a phe­nomenon known as “motiv­ated cog­ni­tion.” People are said to be dis­playing this bias when they uncon­sciously fit their under­stand­ings of inform­a­tion (whether sci­entific data, argu­ments, and even sense impres­sions) to some goal or end extrinsic to forming an accurate answer.

The interest or goal here was the stake study sub­jects had in main­taining a sense of con­nec­tion and solid­arity with their cul­tural groups. Hence, the label cul­tural cog­ni­tion, which refers to the tend­ency of indi­viduals to form per­cep­tions of risk that pro­mote the status of their groups and their own standing within them.

Cultural cog­ni­tion gen­er­ates my uncon­ven­tional “motiv­ated public” model of mis­in­form­a­tion. The sub­jects in our study weren’t pushed around by any external mis­in­form­a­tion pro­vider. Furnished the same inform­a­tion, they sorted them­selves into the pat­terns that char­ac­terize public divi­sions we see on cli­mate change.

This kind of self-generated biased sampling—the tend­ency to count a sci­entist as an “expert” when he takes the pos­i­tion that fits one’s group values but not otherwise—would over time be cap­able all by itself of gen­er­ating a state of rad­ical cul­tural polar­iz­a­tion over what “expert sci­entific con­sensus” is on issues like cli­mate change, nuc­lear power, and gun con­trol.
Of course, out­side the lab, delib­erate mis­in­form­a­tion almost cer­tainly makes things worse.

But the desire of the public to form cul­tur­ally con­genial beliefs sup­plies one of the main incent­ives to fur­nishing them with mis­leading inform­a­tion. To pro­tect their cul­tural iden­tities, indi­viduals more readily seek out inform­a­tion that sup­ports than that chal­lenges the beliefs that pre­dom­inate in their group. The motiv­ated public’s desire for mis­in­form­a­tion thus makes it prof­it­able to become a pro­fes­sional misinformer—whether in the media or in the world of public advocacy.

Other actors will have their own eco­nomic interest in fur­nishing mis­in­form­a­tion. How effective their efforts will be, how­ever, will still depend largely on how cul­tur­ally motiv­ated people are to accept their mes­sage. If this weren’t so, the impact of the prodi­gious efforts of com­mer­cial entities to con­vince people that cli­mate change is a hoax, that nuc­lear power is safe, and that concealed-carry laws reduce crime would wear away the cul­tural divi­sions on these issues.

The reason that indi­viduals with dif­ferent values are motiv­ated to form opposing pos­i­tions on these issues is the sym­bolic asso­ci­ation of them with com­peting groups. But that asso­ci­ation can be cre­ated just as readily by accurate inform­a­tion as by mis­in­form­a­tion if authority fig­ures iden­ti­fied with only one group end up playing a dis­pro­por­tionate role in com­mu­nic­ating it.

One can’t expect to win an “inform­a­tion war of attri­tion” in an envir­on­ment like this. Accurate inform­a­tion will simply bounce off the side that is motiv­ated to resist it.

So am I saying, then, that things are hopeless?

No, far from it.

But the only way to devise rem­edies for these patho­lo­gies is to start with an accurate under­standing of why they occur.

The study of cul­tural cog­ni­tion shows that the con­ven­tional view of mis­in­form­a­tion (external source, cred­u­lous public) is inac­curate because it fails to appre­ciate how much more likely mis­in­form­a­tion is to occur and to matter when sci­entific know­ledge becomes entangled in ant­ag­on­istic cul­tural meanings.

How to free sci­ence from such entan­gle­ments is some­thing that the study of cul­tural cog­ni­tion can help us to figure out too.

Now, would you like me to tell you some­thing about that?


Kahan, D.M. Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk. in Handbook of Risk Theory: Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics and Social Implications of Risk (eds. Hillerbrand, R., Sandin, P., Roeser, S. & Peterson, M.) 725–760 (Springer London, Limited, 2012).

Kahan, D. Fixing the Communications Failure. Nature 463, 296–297 (2010).

Kahan, D., Braman, D., Cohen, G., Gastil, J. & Slovic, P. Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn’t, and Why? An Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition. Law Human Behav 34, 501–516 (2010).

Kahan, D.M. & Braman, D. Cultural Cognition of Public Policy. Yale J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 24, 147–170 (2006).

Kahan, D.M., Braman, D., Slovic, P., Gastil, J. & Cohen, G. Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology. Nature Nanotechnology 4, 87–91 (2009).

Kahan, D.M., Jenkins-Smith, H. & Braman, D. Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus. J. Risk Res. 14, 147–174 (2011).

1 Comment + Add Comment

  • Fascinating and plaus­ible hypo­thesis. Yes I’d love you to describe what sci­ence might do to free itself from such entan­gle­ments. Or at least start to loosen them.

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